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DePuy, his deputy chief of staff for training, Maj. 5 TRADOC’s leaders-including its commanding general, Gen. The previous Continental Army Command was subdivided into operational and institutional elements: Forces Command (FORSCOM) and Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), respectively. In anticipation of this period of reform and modernization, the Army executed a significant reorganization. 3 Finally, the Army’s decade-long focus on lower-intensity fighting in Vietnam had, its senior leaders believed, degraded its technical and tactical proficiency in combined-arms, higher-intensity combat. 2 Third, the experiences of the Army’s senior leaders during Vietnam highlighted the perceived insufficiency of draft-derived junior leadership. 1 Second, the Army’s leadership was attempting to reform in a more transparent environment in which the required costs of land combat were subject to greater, more immediate criticism, especially for the types of limited-objective, discretionary conflicts into which the Army increasingly found itself being drawn after World War II.
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First, the Army was confronting problems of poor morale and discipline as well as a lack of unit cohesion. This transitioning Army faced several other significant obstacles. Army found itself woefully unprepared for a potential attack by the Red Army and its allies. After more than a decade on the rice paddies and in the jungles of Vietnam, the U.S. As it was withdrawing forces from Vietnam, it was simultaneously grappling with the transition to an all-volunteer force, a declining defense budget, a shrinking force structure, and the need to deter a rapidly evolving threat from the Warsaw Pact on the plains of central Europe. Whither the Post-Vietnam Army: Transition and the Problem of Mid-Intensity Conventional Combat Starry’s experience and contributions over this period of reform and modernization illustrate both lessons.
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Second, an Army in transition must demand from its leaders the imperative to combine theory and practice, for doing either in isolation carries the risk of favoring the demands of today over the requirements of tomorrow (or vice versa). In providing the Army a clear objective, such a well-framed, specific problem imparts a sharp focus, a sense of urgency, and the opportunity to generate and maintain momentum. First, for an Army in transition, there is enormous utility in framing and attempting to solve a specific problem. Starry loomed large and offers the current Army many lessons concerning the difficulty, but also the potential impact, of strong institutional leadership. Astride this last major period of Army reform (1973-1986), the influence of Gen.
#Operational art of war 2 manual professional#
As the Army of the early 1970s transitioned out of the war in Vietnam toward a more modernized and professional future, it sought to frame, solve, and then implement a solution to a specific military problem: winning against a quantitatively superior enemy on a battlefield of unprecedented lethality, intensity, and density. Army is experiencing today and what it experienced forty years ago. There are many parallels between what the U.S. (Photo courtesy of Wikipedia) Criticism is necessary and useful it is often indispensable but it can never take the place of action … It is the doer of deeds who actually counts in the battle for life, and not the man who looks on and says how the fight ought to be fought, without himself sharing in the stress and danger.
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Army Training and Doctrine Command from 1977 to 1981 and as Commander in Chief, U.S. Army four-star general who served as Commanding General, U.S. Donn Albert Starry (May 31, 1925–August 26, 2011) was a U.S.